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A classical one-time pad allows two parties to send private messages over a public classical channel
– an eavesdropper who intercepts the communication learns nothing about the message. A quantum
one-time pad is a shared quantum state which allows two parties to send private messages or
private quantum states over a public quantum channel. If the eavesdropper intercepts the quantum
communication she learns nothing about the message. In the classical case, a one-time pad can be
created using shared and partially private correlations. Here we consider the quantum case in the
presence of an eavesdropper, and find the single letter formula for the rate at which the two parties
can send messages using a quantum one-time pad.
Introduction. If two parties wish to send private messages
over a public channel, then they need to share a one-time
pad or key – perfectly correlated and private strings which
are as long as the messages they want to send. Often, the
strings they share are not perfectly correlated or not com-
pletely secure e.g. if produced through a channel subject
to wire-tapping. However, they can perform a protocol
over the public channel to reconcile the errors in their
strings, and amplify the privacy, so that they share a
shorter string which is perfectly correlated and private.
Given access to many independent realizations of some
distribution PXYZ shared between the two parties, Alice
(X) and Bob (Y), and an eavesdropper Eve (Z), the rate
C(PXY Z) at which Alice can send private messages to
Bob was derived in [1], based on a celebrated result due
to Wyner and Csiszar & Korner [2, 3]. It reads
C(PXY Z) = sup
X→U→V
I(V : Y |U)− I(V : Z|U), (1)
with the conditional mutual information I(V : Y |U) :=
H(V U) +H(Y U)−H(V Y U)−H(U), the Shannon en-
tropy H(X) := −∑x PX=x logPX=x and the supremum
taken over the Markov chain X → U → V .
The quantum analog of this is three parties, Alice Bob
and Eve, who instead of sharing a classical distribution,
share a quantum state ψABE . Alice then wishes to send
private messages or private quantum states to Bob over a
quantum public channel i.e. an insecure quantum channel
where the eavesdropper might intercept the sent states.
The question of how many private messages can be sent
using a shared state was posed and answered by Schu-
macher and Westmoreland [4] in the case where initially
the eavesdropper is uncorrelated with the two parties
(ψABE = ψAB ⊗ ψE), and the sent messages are clas-
sical. They proved that the rate of classical private mes-
sages which can be sent is given by the quantum mutual
information I(A : B) := S(A) + S(B) − S(AB), with
S(A) = −Tr ρA log ρA the von Neumann entropy.
Here, we consider the general case where the two par-
ties want to protect themselves against an eavesdropper
who might be correlated with their state. We also ex-
tend the result to the case where the parties wish to send
encrypted quantum states to each other, i.e. any input
state ψK in dimension log d is encrypted so that during
transmission it is indistinguishable from the maximally
mixed state (I/ log d). This makes the scenario a more
fully quantum version of the classical situation. We will
find, in surprising analogy with the classical case, that
the rate Q that Alice can send encrypted quantum states
to Bob using the state ψABE is
Q(ψABE) = sup
A→aα
1
2
(I(a : B|α)− I(a : E|α)), (2)
with the conditional mutual information I(a : B|α) :=
S(aα)+S(Bα)−S(aBα)−S(α) and the supremum taken
over channels which maps ψA to ρaα. Using simple en-
tropic identities, one sees that the right hand side of Eq.
(2) is equivalent to 12 (I(a : Bα)− I(a : Eα)), a quantity
which has made an early appearance in Ref. [5] as the
distillable entanglement assisted by symmetric-side chan-
nels. Note that this optimisation is over single copies of
the state ψABE making the result of Equation (2) single-
letter. This is rare in quantum information theory, where
usually the solutions are intractable, requiring optimisa-
tion over arbitrary many copies of the state.
Statement of the problem. The scenario is as follows:
Alice and Bob share many copies of a quantum sys-
tem in a (generally mixed) state ψAB and since we
want to protect against an arbitrary eavesdropper, we
should imagine that Eve might have any state such that
TrE |ψ〉ABE〈ψ|ABE = ψAB , i.e. the eavesdropper might
hold a purification of Alice and Bob’s state. Alice is given
a message, either classical or quantum, which she should
communicate to Bob. She is able to implement arbitrary
quantum operations on her share ψ⊗nA of the state and
any local ancillas, and she then sends a quantum system
in state ρα to Bob down an insecure quantum channel,
which might be intercepted by Eve. In the case where
Eve intercepts ρα, she should learn an arbitrarily small
amount of information about the message. In the case
where Bob receives the state, he should be able to re-
cover the message with probability converging to one in
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2the limit of large n. More formally:
Definition 1 (private state transfer) Consider the
message state ΨKR shared between the sender Alice
and a reference. Let Alice, Bob and Eve share the
state |ψABE〉⊗n and have further registers a, α and
b for Alice and Bob, respectively. Consider Alice’s
local operation (a completely positive trace preserving
map) MA : AK −→ aα and Bob’s local operation
MB : Bα −→ b. Then a private state transfer protocol
for ΨKR has error δ and security parameter , if
‖ρbR −ΨKR‖1 ≤ δ, (3)
and
‖ρ˜REα − ρ˜R ⊗ ρ˜Eα‖1 ≤ , (4)
where
ρRKaαBE :=MA(ΨKR ⊗ ψ⊗nABE), (5)
and
ρ˜RKabE :=MB ◦MA(ΨKR ⊗ ψ⊗nABE). (6)
For classical messages we let ΨKR =
1
d
∑
k |kk〉〈kk|KR
and define the optimal rate C(ρAB) as the ratio of log(d)
per n, for the largest d for which a private state transfer
protocol is possible, with negligible error for asymptotic
large n.
For the optimal rate of quantum messages, in turn,
we set |ΨKR〉 = 1√d
∑
k |k, k〉KR and define Q(ρAB) as
the asymptotic optimal ratio of log(d)/n, over all private
state transfer protocols.
Schumacher-Westmoreland scheme. To prove Eq. (2),
we will make use of the result from [4] for the one-time-
pad in the case where the message is classical and the
state ρAB shared by Alice and Bob is not correlated with
Eve. The main point of the argument is the construction
of a set of quantum operations { Ek,n} on Alice’s system
and a probability distribution {pk,n} such that in the
limit of large n,
1
n
χ({pk,n, Ek,n ⊗ IB(ψ⊗nAB)})→ I(A : B)ρ, (7)
and
1
n
χ({pk,n, Ek,n(ψ⊗nA )} → 0, (8)
where χ({qk, σk}) := S(
∑
k qkσk) −
∑
k qkS(σk) is the
Holevo information [6]. By the HSW theorem [7] Alice
can then send secret classical messages to Bob at a rate
I(A : B) by applying one of the Ek,n operations to her
part of the state and sending it down the insecure chan-
nel. Eq. (7) guarantees that Bob is able to decode Alice’s
message in the case the channel is not tampered, while
Eq. (8) ensures that Eve does not learn anything from
the message being sent by intercepting the channel.
Mutual independence. A natural quantity which will arise
in our discussion is the so-called mutual independence
IΛ [8], which we now define. Consider some sequence
of maps Λ(n), from a restricted class of operations Λ,
applied to subsystem AB with the property that
ρ
(n)
ABE := Λ
(n) ⊗ IE(ψ⊗nABE) (9)
is such that
‖ρ(n)ABE − ρ(n)AB ⊗ ρ(n)E ‖1 → 0. (10)
Then
Definition 2 (mutual independence) Given a state
ψAB, consider a protocol from a class of operations Λ
for extracting mutual independence P = Λ(n). Define the
rate
R(P, ρAB) := lim inf
n→∞
1
2
I(A : B)Λn(ψ⊗nAB)
. (11)
Then we define the mutual independence rate of ψAB as
IΛ(ρAB) := sup
P
R(P, ψAB). (12)
The quantity IΛ can be thought of as the rate of pri-
vate mutual information that can be extracted from a
state under the class of operations Λ. As an immediate
consequence of Schumacher-Westmoreland construction
and Definition 2, we find that C(ψAB) is lower bounded
by I1-LOCC(ψAB), where 1-LOCC is the class of local op-
erations assisted by one-way classical communication. It
turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that one-way LOCC is
not the right class of operations to be considered here!
As we show, the rate of private messages that can be
sent is given by Iss(ψAB), the mutual independence when
Λ is the class of local operations assisted by a symmetric-
side channel. This is a channel given by an isometry
followed by partial trace ψA → TrE ρBE such that ρBE
is unchanged after interchanging system E with system
B. In [9], it is shown that
Iss(ψAB) = sup
A→aα
1
2
(I(a : B|α)− I(a : E|α)) (13)
where the supremum is taken over channels A→ aα. In
[9], we prove as well that this same quantity is equal to
a weaker variant of mutual independence, in which Eq.
(10) is replaced by the weaker criteria
‖ρ(n)AE − ρ(n)A ⊗ ρ(n)E ‖1 → 0. (14)
Main result. We now show
3Theorem 3
Q(ψAB) = C(ψAB)/2 = Iss(ψAB) (15)
Proof We begin by considering C(ψAB), i.e. Alice
wishes to send Bob a private classical message, and will
then prove the result forQ(ψAB). To see that Iss(ψAB) ≥
C(ψAB)/2, consider an optimal protocol for C(ψAB),
which can always be taken to be as follows: Alice ap-
plies the quantum operation Ek,n ⊗ IBE with probability
pk,n, generating the ABE ensemble {pk,n, Ek,n(ψABE)},
with ρα = Ek,n(ψA) being sent to Bob, and k the private
message to be communicated. Then we have
C(ψAB) = lim
n→∞
1
n
χ(pk,n, Ek,n ⊗ IB(ψAB)). (16)
Consider the state after Alice’s optimal local operation
ρnKABE :=
∑
k
pk,n|k〉K〈k| ⊗ (Ek,n ⊗ IBE) (ψABE) (17)
Then, from Eq. (13) we get
Iss(ψAB) ≥ 1
2
(I(K : Bα)ρ − I(K : Eα)ρ) . (18)
But I(K : Bα)ρ = χ(pk,n, Ek,n ⊗ IB(ψAB)) and I(K :
Eα)nρ → 0 with increasing n, since Ek,n ⊗ IE(ψAE) must
satisfy Condition (4) and be asymptotically independent
of k. Therefore we get Iss(ψAB) ≥ C(ψAB)/2.
Next we need to show that Iss(ψAB) ≤ C(ψAB)/2.
First, suppose that on top of the insecure ideal quantum
channel Alice and Bob have access to a symmetric-side
channel. Then they could distill Iss(ψAB) of mutual in-
dependence, using the symmetric side-channel. They are
now in the situation considered by Schumacher and West-
moreland, who showed that in the case where Alice and
Bob are initially product with Eve, C(ψAB) = I(A : B).
Thus here we would get C(ψAB) = 2Iss(ψAB) of secure
classical communication.
Of course in the setting we are considering, they do not
have access to the symmetric side-channel. However sup-
pose Alice simulates locally the side-channel, sends the
part that would go to Bob through the insecure quan-
tum channel and traces out the part which would go to
Eve. Then, on one hand, if Eve does not intercept the
channel, Bob will get his share of what is send through
the symmetric side-channel and they can distill at least
Iss(ψAB) of weak mutual independence and achieve the
rate C = 2Iss(ψAB). I.e. if Eve doesn’t get her share
of the output α′ of the symmetric side-channel Alice and
Bob can not be in a worse position than if she did receive
it. On the other hand, if Eve intercepts the state sent
through the insecure channel, then this is the same state
she would get in the case they were connected by a sym-
metric side-channel (because what goes to Bob and Eve
is symmetric), so Eve must still be decoupled from Alice’s
final state. This is so because Alice and Eve’s state must
be product in the end of the protocol for distilling mutual
independence. Thus she gets no information about ρK .
This proves C = 2Iss(ψAB). That Q(ψAB) =
C(ψAB)/2 comes from the fact that instead of using the
quantum one-time pad to send private messages, Alice
and Bob could just as well use it to share a classical pri-
vate key
∑ |kk〉〈kk|AB/d2. This key can then be used to
encrypt quantum states which can then be sent through
the insecure quantum channel.
It is known [10–12] that the amount of key required
to encrypt a state of dimension log d is given by 2 log d.
In more detail, The procedure for encrypting a quan-
tum state is for Alice to perform randomizing unitaries∑
k |k〉〈k|⊗Uk controlled on the classical key where Uk is
a complete set of unitaries acting on the state she wants
to encrypt. Bob can then decrypt the quantum state by
performing U†k . E.g. to encrypt a qubit, Alice acts one
of the four Pauli operators I, σx, σy, σz with the choice of
which operator to act decided by two bits of key. uunionsq
Note that when we are using the key to encrypt quantum
states, we can modify the protocol slightly to include an
authentication step [13, 14] so that if at some later point,
Bob is allowed at least one bit of backwards communica-
tion, the key can be recycled [13, 15] and used to encrypt
more quantum states. The bit of back-communication is
required to signal to Alice that the protocol succeeded
(i.e. that Eve didn’t disturb the sent states too much)
and is not part of the orignal scenario considered here.
However, in such a case, one can prove that the one-time
pad can be recycled in the case where we are using it to
send quantum states [15]!
A direct protocol. We can also construct a different pro-
tocol which encrypts quantum states directly using the
one-time pad without first using it to create a classical
key. This results in a saving of log d uses of the public
quantum channel.
Recall that to create a classical key, Alice applies
Ek ⊗ IBE(ψ⊗nABE) conditioned on a random classical vari-
able k. To encrypt a quantum state directly, Alice ap-
plies Ek coherently, controlled on her half K of the en-
tangled state ψKR =
∑
pk|k〉R|k〉K , i.e. she performs
the operation
∑ |k〉〈k|K ⊗ Vk, where Vk is an isomet-
ric extension of the operation Ek. This produces the
total state |Ψ〉 = ∑ pk|k〉R|k〉K |ψk〉αα′BE where ρkα′ is
the local environment produced under the action of map
Ek and ρα is its output. Alice then sends ρα to Bob,
who can then coherently decode ρkαB producing the state∑
pk|k〉R|k〉K |k〉B′ |ψ0〉αα′BE . The protocol is thus far
secure, because after tracing out system K, the state
ρRαE is exactly the same as in the case of sending a clas-
sical message, and thus satisfies the privacy condition
(4).
Since the state
∑
pk|k〉R|k〉K |k〉B′ has S(K|B′) = 0,
Alice can merge [16] her share (K) of the state to Bob
by performing a complete measurement in a random ba-
4sis and communicating the result to Bob. In [16] it was
shown that S(K|B′) is the amount of EPR pairs that
is needed to send Alice’s share K of |ψ〉KB′R by per-
forming a measurement and if S(K|B′) = 0, then no
additional EPR pairs are needed. Alice’s merging mea-
surement completely decouples the K system from the
reference, with the result that if Alice sends the remain-
der of her systems to Bob, the state must have been
transmitted. She could also perform a measurement in
the Fourier basis and communicate the result. Since the
measurement is complete, the number of measurement
outcomes is just nH(K), and because we wish Eve to
learn no information about the state, Alice needs to use
an additional nH(K) of the quantum one-time pad to
encrypt the measurement result and send it.
Alice’s measurement result is independent of the final
state (as in teleportation [17]) so we can do the measur-
ing and sending coherently, which will result in nH(K)
EPR pairs being created [18] in the case where Eve does
not interfere with the channel. However, these EPR pairs
can only be used at some later time if Bob verifies that he
received them using an authentication scheme involving
at least one bit of back-communication [14]. Note that
if R is held by Alice, both protocols for sending quan-
tum states can also be used to create secure EPR pairs
between Alice and Bob.
The direct protocol for encrypting quantum states uses
log d less uses of the channel than if we first create a
classical key, and then send encrypted quantum states.
As a result, log d less bits of key is left over if we are
allowed back communication at some later point in time
to recycle the key. This is in keeping with a fundamental
law of privacy [15] relating sent qubits (δQ), the change
in the amount of shared key (δK), and messages sent
(δM) (whether they be classical or quantum):
δK ≤ δQ− δM . (19)
It is also worth noting the connection between merg-
ing, and encryption of the quantum states in this case.
Encrypting the quantum state means that Alice’s share
of |Ψ〉KR should be decoupled from the reference R be-
fore being sent down the channel. At the same time,
this decoupling of the reference from Alice’s laboratory
is the condition for Alice to succeed in sending her share
[16, 19].
Approximate encryption with half key. As we have noted,
the condition for decoupling system K from the reference
R is that 2 log d unitaries are applied. It turns out there
is a weaker form of quantum state encryption, where only
slightly more than log d bits of key are used [20]. In such a
case, the protocol is secure in the sense that if a measure-
ment were to be performed on the reference system, then
an eavesdropper would learn an arbitrary small amount
about the measurement result. We say that the level
of security we obtain is not composable [21, 22], meaning
that if the reference system remains unmeasured, and the
eavesdropper does not measure the parts of the quantum
system she intercepted, then we may loose security if we
use the encrypted state in another protocol.
We can easily construct an encryption scheme of this
sort, by adapting the first protocol we presented, so that
instead of choosing a complete set of 2 log d unitaries
Uk which act on the state we are encrypting, we choose
just over log d unitaries at random from the Haar mea-
sure [23]. Such a set is called randomizing rather than
completely randomizing. It is unclear whether the direct
protocol can be adapted in some way for approximate en-
cryption. This is because the protocol uses merging, and
thus the state to be sent must be completely decoupled
from the reference system.
Discussion. There are essentially two ways we have used
the quantum one-time pad. One way is to use ψAB to
obtain a correlated and private key, and then use this key
to encrypt messages (quantum or classical). The second,
is a generalisation of Schumacher and Westmoreland [4]
where the one-time is used directly to encrypt the mes-
sage. This also holds true in the case of classical distri-
butions.
Our results can also be applied to channel coding,
where one has an authenticated noisy quantum channel,
which produces the state ψABE , and a public quantum
channel. Here we have just taken ψABE as a static re-
source, but we could have just imagined that it was pro-
duced by a channel from Alice to Bob and Eve. This
is perhaps closest to a quantum version of the Csiszar-
Korner situation and gives a physical application to the
results of [5, 9, 24], about state and channel capacities
assisted by a symmetric-side channel.
We should thus think of a symmetric channel not as an
exotic side-channel which can be used in conjunction with
a standard quantum channel. Rather, results which make
use of a symmetric channel can be applied to the situation
where an eavesdropper might intercept the quantum sys-
tems that are sent down an insecure channel. This gives
further motivation to the notion of the public quantum
channel as emphasised in [9].
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